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IS THERE A LEGAL AND CONSERVATION BASIS
FOR INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS?
George J Mannina, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976' (Magnuson-Stevens Act or Act), and subsequently amended the
Act in 1996, it recognized the need to establish a comprehensive conser-
vation and management program for the fisheries found off of the U.S.
coast. Since enactment in 1976, there has been an expansion in the
capacity of the U.S. fishing fleet, and there also has been a growing
debate among fisheries managers about whether fishery management plans
(FMP) should include provisions limiting U.S. fishing effort and allocat-
ing the fish among U.S. fishermen. The purpose of this Article is to
examine the issues associated with one such allocation system-individual
fishing quotas (IFQs).2
* Senior Partner, O'Connor & Hannan, L.L.P. B.S., Cornell University; J.D., American
University. Prior to joining O'Connor & Hannan, the author served as an administrative
aide to Congressman Gilbert Gude; Legislative Director for Congressman Edwin B.
Forsythe; Counsel to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife,
Conservation and the Environment; and Chief Counsel and StaffDirector for the Republican
Members of the House of Representatives Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.
During his tenure with the Subcommittee, the author was one of the principal staffmembers
involved with the original enactment of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act. The author expresses his sincere gratitude to Bridget E. Kenny for her
research and other contributions to this Article.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994). The Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
renamed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1977, amended by
the Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996), which again
renamed the statute the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
2. An IFQ is an allocated privilege in the form of quota shares to harvest a determined
portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) in the form of quota shares. These quota shares
designate how the TAC is to be "subdivided into specified portions for individual quota
holders." Eugene H. Buck, CRS Report 95-849 ENR, Individual Transferable Quotas in
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This Article begins in Part II by outlining the legal framework for U.S.
fisheries management. The Article then analyzes, through an examination
of legislative history, case law, and governmental agency opinions, the
legal basis for management-based IFQ plans. This analysis continues in
Part III by discussing the various provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
which have been involved in IFQ litigation and also discusses recent
amendments to the Act that may be cited in future litigation. This Part
discusses the legal arguments that have been made, and those that may be
made in the future both for and against the legality of IFQ plans. Next,
Part IV examines whether IFQs are an effective management tool by
analyzing the three U.S. fisheries in which IFQ or ITQ plans have been
established. Finally, this Article concludes that the legal precedent,
legislation, surveys, and empirical data demonstrate that there is both a
legal and conservation basis for IFQs.
II. U.S. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
In the United States, the first serious attempt to address fisheries
jurisdiction and conservation issues came in September 1945 with Presi-
dent Harry Truman's proclamation, The Policy of the United States With
Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas.3 President
Truman declared:
In view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of
fisheries resources, the Government of the United States of America
regards it as proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of
the high seas contiguous to the coast of the United States wherein
fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and
Fishery Management 1 (Sept. 25, 1995); See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
IFQs differ from individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in that under an IFQ program
transferability of shares is an optional component of the FMP. Under an IFQ program that
permits transferability of shares, transferability is restricted by several criteria. Buck, supra
note 2, at 6 n.18.
Quota share management systems differ from traditional open access fisheries in which
there is no limitation on who may catch fish. These programs also differ from fishery
management programs that limit the number of licenses issued to participant fishermen. Id.
at 1-2. See generally Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based Fishing, in
RIGHTS BASED FISHING 11, 31 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989); LIMITED ENTRY AS A
FIsHERIEs MANAGEMENT TOOL (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J.C. Ginter eds., 1978).
3. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation).
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maintained on a substantial scale... and all fishing activities in such
zones shall be subject to regulation and control....'
However, President Truman's call for action was not fully implemented
in the United States until passage of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.'
A. The Legal Framework of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
The Magnuson-Stevens Act asserts U.S. fisheries management authority
within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)6 extending 200 miles from the
U.S. coast.7 The Act establishes a bifurcated decision-making process for
managing fishery resources within the EEZ which calls for "basic policy
determinations... and management strategies to rest with"8 the Regional
Fishery Management Councils (Councils) created by the Act. The
Magnuson-Stevens Act divides the United States into eight geographic
regions and creates a Council for each region.9 Each Council is corn-
4. S. REP. No. 94-416 (1975), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COML ON COMMERCEAND
NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENTACT OF 1976 653, 660 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
5. It is not the purpose of this Article to supply a detailed analysis of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act and the historical development of U.S. fisheries legislation; for a thorough
discussion, see FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, A GUIDEBOOK TO THE MAGNUSON
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 2 (J. Jacobson et al. eds., 1985 & Supp.
1991). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4; Warren G. Magnuson, The Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of
Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REv. 427,430 (1977).
6. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). When originally enacted in 1976, the
Act created a "fshery management zone." See Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101, 90 Stat. 331, 336 (1976). The zone was renamed as the
exclusive economic zone when the Act was amended in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-659, sec. 101,
§ 1811, 100 Stat. 3706, 3707 (1986).
7. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
8. William R. Rogalski, Note, The Unique Federalism of the Regional Councils Under
the Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976, B.C. ENVL. AFF. L. REv. 163, 171-
72 (1980).
9. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). See generally Rogalski, supra
note 8, at 163. The Councils' titles and geographic areas are: (1) New England-Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; (2) Mid-Atlantic-New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina; (3) South Atlan-
tic-North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida; (4) Caribbean-Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico; (5) Gulf-Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida; (6) Pacific-California,
8 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:5
prised of voting and non-voting members"0 who are charged with the
responsibility of making "basic policy determinations such as optimum
yield and management strategies."'" The Act requires that the voting
members of each Council be knowledgeable about the management,
conservation or harvest of fishery resources.' 2
The primary responsibility for each of the Councils is to develop, and
amend when necessary, an FMP for each fishery in its region that requires
conservation and management. 13 The Councils maintain no regulatory
authority under the terms of the Act. Rather, the Secretary of Commerce
(Secretary) is vested with the review and rulemaking authority. As such,
Council's submit their proposed FMP to the Secretary for approval,
disapproval, or partial disapproval.' 4 Upon approval, the Secretary
implements the FMP by regulation."' The Magnuson-Stevens Act also
authorizes the Secretary to develop an FMP in the event that a Council
fails to do so in a timely manner 16 and permits the Secretary to promulgate
emergency regulations when necessary."
Oregon, Idaho, Washington; (7) North Pacific -Oregon, Washington, Alaska; (8) Western
Pacific-Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the North Marina Islands. 16 U.S.C. § 1852
(a)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
10. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(b), (c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). The voting members of
each Council are: (1) the appropriate regional director of the U.S. National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS); (2) the principal state official with marine fisheries management
responsibility for each coastal state in the Council's region; (3) individuals appointed by the
Secretary from a list of people nominated by the Governor of each state who are knowledge-
able with regard to the management, conservation, or harvest of fishery resources. Id. § 1852
(b). The nonvoting members include: (1) the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's regional
director; (2) the commander of the applicable Coast Guard district; (3) a State Department
representative; and (4) the Executive Director of the Marine Fisheries Commission for the
geographical area concerned, if any. Id. § 1852 (c).
11. Rogalski, supra note 8, at 171-72. See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4,
at 492 (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens, Alaska).
12. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
13. Id. § 1852(h)(1). Other duties of the Councils include: (1) submitting periodic
reports to the Secretary of Commerce; (2) reviewing and revising assessments of optimum
yield and fishing allowances to foreign vessels; (3) encouraging public participation in the
development of FMPs and the administration of the Act; (4) establishing scientific and
statistical committees and advisory panels; and (5) other activities necessary to carry out the
Act. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 436.
14. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a)(1)(D), (b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
15. Id. § 1854(b)(3).
16. Id. § 1854(c).
17. Id. § 1855(c).
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In developing FMPs, the Councils are to be governed by ten national
standards.18 These standards require that conservation and management
measures: (1) prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum yield from
the fishery; (2) be based on the best scientific information available; (3)
manage fish as a unit to the extent practicable; (4) not discriminate
between residents of different states and if it is necessary to allocate fish
among fishermen the allocation is to be fair and equitable, promote
conservation, and carried out so that no person acquires an excessive
share; (5) consider efficiency where practicable; (6) take into account
variations and contingencies in the fishery; (7) minimize costs and avoid
unnecessary duplication where practicable; (8) take into account the
importance of fishery resources to fishing communities; (9) minimize
bycatch to the extent practicable; and (10) promote the safety of human
life at sea to the extent practicable.19 The Act requires that all FMPs be
18. Id. § 1851.
19. Id. § 1851(a). The ten national standards are as follows:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United
States fishing industry.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific
information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in
close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between
residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing
privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair
and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conserva-
tion; and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or
other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall
have economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for
variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation
requirements of this chapter (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding
of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to the
fishing community in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such
communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts
on such communities.
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consistent with these national standards, as well as with other provisions
of the Act and applicable law.2'
B. Fishery Management Plans and Individual Fishing Quotas
An FMP is comprised of "conservation and management" measures that
are necessary and appropriate.2' However, the Act requires that every
FMP contain certain provisions' and makes other measures discretion-
ary.' One of the most controversial discretionary provisions that may be
included in an FMP are measures establishing a limited access system "in
order to achieve optimum yield."'24 The 1975 Senate Commerce Commit-
tee Report, which contains virtually all of the discussion on limited access,
described limited access as:
[A] management technique that is directed at economic as well as
biological objectives. This technique is used to reduce the congestion
and economic waste which often occurs from the "open access"
condition of common property fisheries. There are three different
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the
mortality of such bycatch.
(10) Conservation and Management measures shall, to the extent practicable,
promote the safety of human life at sea.
Id. § 1851(a).
20. Id. § 1854(a), (b)(1). In order to assist the Councils in their task, the Secretary has
established guidelines based on the national standards. Guidelines for Fishery Management
Plans, 50 C.F.R. pt. 602 (1995), removed by 61 Fed. Reg. 32,577, recodified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 600, see 61 Fed. Reg. 32,538-32,554 (1996).
21. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(1)(A) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
22. Id. § 1853(a).
23. Id. § 1853(b).
24. Id. § 1853(b)(6). "Optimum" is defined as follows:
The term "optimum," with respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount of
fish which-
(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect
to food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the
protection of marine ecosystems;
(B) is prescribed on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as
reduced by any relevant social, economic, or ecological factor; and
(C) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent
with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.
Id. § 1802(28).
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techniques for limiting access. One is the use of licensing schemes
which limits the number of units in a fishery. This might be a limit
on the number of vessels, fishermen, nets, pots or other kind of
inputs. The second technique is to control the amount of capital and
labor through taxes or license fees in an amount sufficiently high to
dissuade superfluous fishermen from entering the fishery. The third
technique is to divide the total allowable catch into shares or quotas
which are then distributed among the fisherm[e]n.'
Since enactment, people have debated whether the Act authorized
individual fishing quotas, and whether they are appropriate for fisheries
conservation and management.2 However, the Sustainable Fisheries
Act,z2 signed into law by President Clinton on October 11, 1996, finally
settled this debate over IFQs. The Sustainable Fisheries Act added the
following definition of IFQs to the Magnuson-Stevens Act: "The term
'individual fishing quota' means a Federal permit under a limited access
system to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units represent-
ing a percentage of the total allowable catch of a fishery that may be
received or held for exclusive use by a person."' Although the addition
of this definition makes it clear that IFQs are an authorized form of
limited access, the Sustainable Fisheries Act also includes a section
governing the development of IFQs and creates additional standards by
which IFQs are to be measured. 29 Additionally, the Senate Report on the
Sustainable Fisheries Act states that the "term 'individual transferable
quota' would .. .mean a type of IFQ that is transferable,"" thereby
officially acknowledging the transferability of IFQs. Given the historical
and often heated debate about the legality of IFQs, the enactment and
content of the Sustainable Fisheries Act raises the question: Is there any
remaining basis to challenge an IFQ plan as exceeding the authority
granted under the Magnuson-Stevens Act?
25. S. REP. No. 94-416, (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
691-92.
26. See infra Part IH.
27. Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996). The Sustainable Fisheries Act
amended and reauthorized provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.
28. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (21) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
29. Id. § 1853(d).
30. S.REP.No. 104-276, at 10 (1996).
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III. POTENTIAL REMAINING BASIS TO CHALLENGE
IFQs As EXCEEDING THE AUTHORITY GRANTED
UNDER THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT
IFQ opponents argue that IFQs are fundamentally inconsistent with the
Magnuson-Stevens Act because the Act is intended to address fishery
conservation issues and IFQs are simply a means of allocating economic
benefits. This part of the Article will examine the legal basis for an IFQ
plan utilized as a management measure without any biological conserva-
tion basis. The part will analyze whether management based IFQ plans:
(1) fall within the purposes of the Act; (2) satisfy the Act's conservation
and management definition; (3) conform with the Act's national standards;
and (4) satisfy the Magnuson-Stevens Act's mandatory FMP provisions.
This analysis of the language of the Act, legislative history, judicial
precedent and legal opinions clearly demonstrates that if a management
based IFQ plan is in accord with the Act, then a properly supported plan
which blends biological, economic, and management objectives can
withstand judicial scrutiny.
A. The Purposes of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
The objectives of the Act define and limit the purposes for which FMP
conservation and management measures, such as limited access systems,
may be established. Although IFQ opponents correctly assert that fish
conservation is the foundation of the Act, an IFQ plan without a biological
conservation basis does not necessarily fall outside the Act's purposes, as
the Act's findings, purposes, and policy section encompasses economic
and social goals.3' This section provides that: fish off the coasts of the
United States "contribute to the food supply, economy, and health of the
Nation;"32 commercial fishing "constitutes a major source of employment
and contributes significantly to the economy of the Nation; 33 many coastal
areas are "dependent upon fishing and related activities;"34 a national
fisheries development program for fisheries which are not fully utilized by
U.S. fishermen is necessary "to assure that our citizens benefit from the
employment, food supply, and revenue which could be generated there-
31. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
32. Id. § 1801(a)(1).
33. Id. § 1801(a)(3).
34. Id.
[V/ol. 3:5
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by;"' Councils should prepare FMPs "which take into account the social
and economic needs of the States;"3 6 FMPs should be responsive to the
needs of "interested States and citizens;"37 a conservation and management
program for fisheries is necessary to prevent overfishing; 3' and to achieve,
on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery; 39 and,
conservation and management programs shall consider efficiency, avoid
the unnecessary waste of fish, minimize bycatch, and be workable and
effective.4
While these broadly stated principles of the Act do not reference
allocations, let alone IFQs, a careful reading demonstrates that IFQs are
consistent with the Act's findings, purposes, and policies. Even when
IFQs are helpful only in realizing such goals as promoting efficiency and
accounting for local social and economic needs, quota programs are still
in accord with the Act's principles. In instances where an IFQ plan also
intends to prevent overfishing,41 minimize bycatch, 42 prevent waste, etc.,
it is even clearer that the plan is within the Act's purposes.
This broad view of the Act's purposes accords with the views of the
Justice Department which has stated that the guiding purpose of the Act
is to "protect the food supply of the United States, the national fishing
industry, and dependent coastal economies from the stresses caused by
overfishing in the seas adjacent to our territorial waters, to rebuild
35. Id. § 1801(a)(7).
36. Id. § 1801(b)(5).
37. Id. § 1801(c)(3).
38. Id. § 1801 (a)(6).
39. Id. § 1801(b)(4).
40. Id. § 1801(c)(3).
41. Following the enactment of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, "overfishing" is defined
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act as: "a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the
capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis." Id.
§ 1802(29).
42. The following definition of bycatch was added to the Act by the enactment of the
Sustainable Fisheries Act: "'bycatch' means fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which
are not sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards and regulatory
discards. Such term does not include fish released alive under a recreational catch and
release fishery management program." Id. § 1802(2). Economic discards are fish "which
are the target of the fishery, but which are not retained because they are of an undesirable
size, sex, or quality, or for other economic reasons." Id. § 1802(9). Regulatory discard
refers to those fish "harvested in a manner which fishermen are required by regulation to
discard whenever caught or are required by regulation to retain but not sell." Pub. L. No.
104-297, 110 Stat. 3561 § 102(33) (1996).
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overfished stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full potential
of the Nation's fishery resources. 43 Similarly, the courts view the Act's
purposes as encompassing broad economic, social, and conservation
goals. In Stinson Canning Company, Inc. v. Mosbacher,4 the court found
the relevant factors which could be examined to justify an FMP included:
"[T]he provision of seafood at reasonable prices, satisfaction of consumer
needs, encouragement of domestic markets, and the economies of coastal
",45
areas . ...
Based on the broad language of the Act's findings, purposes, and policy
section, combined with the government's and court's expansive interpreta-
tion of the Act's purposes, it cannot be said that IFQs, even IFQs based
exclusively on management needs, are per se inconsistent with the Act's
findings, purposes and policies.
B. What is a Conservation and Management Measure Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Act?
If management based IFQs are not precluded by the Act's purposes, the
next level of analysis is whether such IFQs fit within the narrower
definition of a conservation and management measure. The term "conser-
vation and management" is defined in Section 3(2) of the Act as:
[A]I1 of the rules, regulations, conditions, methods, and other
measures (A) which are required to rebuild, restore, or maintain, and
which are useful in rebuilding, restoring, or maintaining, any fishery
resource and the marine environment; and (B) which are designed to
assure that-
i) a supply of food and other products may be taken, and that
recreational benefits may be obtained, on a continuing basis;
ii) irreversible or long-term adverse effects on fishery resources
and the marine environment are avoided; and
43. Brief for Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, Federal Appellee at 6, Alaska
Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-4410). The
court misspelled "Baldrige" in the case citation.
44. 731 F. Supp. 32 (D. Me. 1990).
45. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 3:5
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ill) there will be a multiplicity of options available with respect to
future uses of these resources. 46
The question of whether an IFQ satisfies the Act's "conservation and
management" requirement entails a two prong analysis, since clauses A
and B are linked by the connector "and." If so, a proposal cannot be a
valid conservation and management measure if its purpose is to confer
economic or social benefits, because clause A requires that "conservation
and management" measures contain a biological basis to "rebuild, restore,
or maintain" a fishery resource and the marine environment.47 This
argument may be extended by asserting that each component of an FMP
must have its own fish conservation basis. Under this view, an FMP is
not to be judged as a whole, but each component must pass muster
individually.
The biological basis argument is supported by references to the legisla-
tive history. The Senate Commerce Committee Report stated that the
central purpose of the legislation was "to protect and conserve valuable
and necessary fishery resources."48 The bill approved by the Senate
Commerce Committee contained a definition of "conservation" essentially
identical to the final definition of "conservation and management" in
section 3(2) of the Act.49 The Senate Committee, in describing this
definition, stated: "The term 'conservation' is interchangeable with the
term 'management."' 50 The final legislation adopted by Congress added
the words "and management" as part of the basic term defined in section
3(2).51 The Conference Committee Report does not elaborate on the
addition of the words "and management." Based on the original Senate
Committee Report, it is argued that the words "conservation" and "man-
agement" are synonymous and that each component of an FMP must have
a conservation basis.
In considering the Act's legislative history, it is important to recognize
that the term "conservation and management" was developed by the
House-Senate Conference Committee as a compromise between H.R. 200
46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(5) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
47. ld
48. S. REP. No. 94-416, (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
655.
49. Id. at 701-02.
50. Id. at 674.
51. S. REP. No. 94-711, (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
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and S. 961. H.R. 200, as originally passed by the House, required that
FMPs contain "conservation and other measures. '52  The Senate bill
required each Council to "identify fisheries in need of conservation" and
to prepare FMPs for those fisheries. 3 The restrictive Senate language
limiting FMPs to fisheries in need of conservation was deleted by the
Conference Committee and replaced with general authority for Councils
"to develop fishery management plans" containing conservation and
management measures, implying that conservation and management are
separate concepts. 4
The interpretation of the term "conservation and management" was at
issue in National Fisheries Institute, Inc. v. Mosbacher,55 which involved
a challenge to the Atlantic Billfish FMP. Plaintiffs advanced two argu-
ments. First, they argued that a FMP must have a biological conservation
basis. 6 The Justice Department responded by stating that the "clear
language of the Act identifies conservation to be a separate concept from
management of a fishery. Congress intended that fishery management
plans do more than conserve a fishery."57 Thus, the Justice Department's
argument followed the concept implicit in the Conference Committee
report.
In addressing this argument, the court recognized that conservation is
an important element of any FMP promulgated under the Act. 58 How-
ever, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument. The opinion states:
[T]he Court does not agree with the [plaintiffs'] argument that
conservation is the only factor that the Secretary may consider in
promulgating [Magnuson-Stevens] Act regulations . . . . [T]his
conclusion comports with a common sense construction of the term
"conservation and management," in which the two words do not have
synonymous and redundant meanings. In light of the term's preva-
52. CONFERENCE POLICY IssuEs SUMMARY, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 106 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 179.
54. S. REP. NO. 94-711, (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
87.
55. 732 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990).
56. Id. at 219.
57. Federal Defendant's Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary
Judgment and Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, National Fisheries
Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 88-3103 CRR).
58. National Fisheries Inst. Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. at 219.
[Vol. 3:5
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lence throughout the Act, the Court does not believe that Congress
intended the "management" part of it to be mere surplusage.59
The plaintiffs also argued that each component of an FMP must be
examined separately for a conservation basis. In response, the Justice
Department said the Act directs Councils to develop comprehensive plans
for fisheries conservation and management, and mandates that FMPs
incorporate a broad range of considerations, including biological, eco-
nomic, and social concerns. 6° The court agreed, stating:
The Court will not ignore certain conservation and management
measures, as the plaintiffs urge, simply because the plaintiffs have
not challenged these parts of the FMP. By only considering isolated
provisions in a vacuum, the Court cannot determine whether the
Secretary's decision to implement this comprehensive FMP was
arbitrary or capricious, especially when . . other provisions are
highly relevant to the issues before the Court.6 '
The federal courts have also upheld FMPs that allocated fish among
competing user groups without regard for the biological basis of the
measures. Louisiana v. Baldridge62 upheld a management measure "to
protect shrimp until they reach a more valuable size and thereby eliminate
the wasteful practice of discarding undersized brown shrimp."6' The
challenged measure was not adopted for biological conservation purposes,
but solely to enhance the economic value of the fishery. Similarly, in
Maine v. Kreps, 6 the court resolved a dispute over an economically based
allocation of herring and upheld the Secretary's decision to allocate fish
to foreign fishermen. The court deferred to the Secretary's "substantial
discretion in selecting the appropriate quota for a given fishery."'6
59. Id.
60. Federal Defendant's Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 29, 31, National Fisheries Inst., Inc.
v. Mosbacher 732 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990).
61. National Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. at 221 n.15.
62. 538 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. La. 1982). The Secretary of Commerce was Malcolm
Baldrige. The court misspelled BaIdrige in the case citation. This text uses the court's
spelling.
63. Id at 627.
64. 563 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 1055.
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A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) General
Counsel Opinion is also consistent with these judicial decisions. This
Opinion construes "conservation and management" as allowing any
purpose that can be inferred from the Act as the basis for an FMP
provision.' The relevant portion of the opinion states: "We believe a
strict reading of the definition of 'conservation and management' is
inconsistent with the Act's many expressions of permissible economic and
social goals.,
67
Thus, the legislative history of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, judicial
decisions, and opinions of NOAA General Counsel all acknowledge that
IFQs can be justified under the Act as a management measure, even if
such measures have no biological conservation purpose.
C. The Act's National Standards
If a proposal satisfies the definition of "conservation and management,"
the next issue is whether a management based IFQ can satisfy the national
standards. 68 Although an FMP cannot violate any of the national stan-
dards, 69 National Standards 4 and 5 have presented special issues when an
FMP establishes an IFQ system. This section will present an overview of
National Standards 4 and 5 and will analyze court decisions in which
plaintiffs have alleged violations of these particular national standards.
Additionally, this section will examine National Standards 8, 9, and 10,
which were added to the Magnuson-Stevens Act by the Sustainable
Fisheries Act and discuss how these new standards may affect future IFQ
litigation.
66. 80 Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, NOAA 8-11 (Aug. 28, 1979).
67. Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, NOAA 7 (Dec. 1, 1989).
68. Section 301(a) of the Act provides that: "[a]ny fishery management plan prepared,
and any regulation promulgated to implement any such plan.., shall be consistent with the
*.. national standards for fishery conservation and management." 16 U.S.C.A. § 185 1(a)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
The requirement for consistency with the national standards is repeated in § 303(a)(1)(C),
regarding the contents of an FMP, and in § 304(a)(1)(A), specifying the basis for Secretarial
review of an FMP. Id. §§ 1853(a)(1)(C), 1854(a)(1)(A).
69. Id. § 1851(a).
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1. National Standard 4
National Standard 4 establishes two rules for conservation and manage-
ment measures. The first rule forbids discrimination between residents of
different states;7" the second rule addresses the allocation of fishing
privileges.7 When a conservation and management measure allocates
fishery resources, the allocations must be: (1) "fair and equitable to all
such fishermen;"' (2) "reasonably calculated to promote conservation;"'73
and, (3) "carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corpora-
tion, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges."74
Although the two rules of National Standard 4 must be analyzed sepa-
rately,75 this Article separately discusses each of the three allocation
requirements, and the extent to which each one meets requirements for an
allocation set forth in the second rule of National Standard 4.
a. The Fairness and Equity of an Individual Fishing Quota
In determining the fairness and equity of an FMP, the guidelines
(Guidelines),76 published by the Secretary establish two tests. In June
1996, the guidelines were deauthorized. The first test stated that an
allocation should be rationally connected with (1) achieving optimum yield
or (2) the furtherance of a legitimate FMP objective. An allocation could
satisfy the requirement by fulfilling either of the two prongs. The second
test was whether the overall benefits of the allocation outweigh its burdens
on the industry. This substantive standard is referred to as the compara-
tive benefits test.77
70. let § 1851(a)(4).
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. National Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 225 n.23 (D.D.C.
1990).
76. To provide guidance regarding the interpretation and application of the national
standards, the Secretary has published advisory guidelines. 50 C.F.R. § 602 (1995),
removedby 61 Fed. Reg. 32,577, recodifiedat 50 C.F.R. pt. 600, see 61 Fed. Reg. 32,538
(1996). Although the Guidelines are not binding, FMPs prepared by the Councils that are
consistent with the guidelines must be approved by the Secretary. Id § 602.10(a)(3) (1995),
§ 600.305(a)(1) (1996).
77. Id. §602.14(c)(3)(i) (1995); § 600.325(c)(3)(i) (1996)
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As to whether a management based IFQ meets the first test, the legal
analysis need proceed no further then an analysis of plan objectives. The
Guidelines stated:
In designing an allocation scheme, a Council should consider other
factors relevant to the FMP's objectives. Examples are economic
and social consequences of the scheme, food production, consumer
interest, dependence on the fishery by present participants and coastal
communities, efficiency of various types of gear used in the fishery,
transferability of effort to and impact on other fisheries, opportunity
for new participants to enter the fishery, and enhancement of oppor-
tunities for recreational fishing.78
The analysis used in determining if an FMP objective was legitimate is
identical to that used to determine if a proposal fits within the Act's
purposes and policy. Thus, an FMP objective, and hence an IFQ objec-
tive, is legitimate if it furthers the purposes of the Act.
Additionally, an allocation scheme could satisfy this first test if a
measure was rationally connected with achieving optimum yield. An IFQ
plan which helped reduce bycatch, allowed for less discard wastage, or
reduced the likelihood of overfishing would assist in achieving optimum
yield. As discussed in Section IV, IFQ plans can achieve this objective,
and an administrative record documenting these benefits will enable plan
proponents to demonstrate the IFQ plan satisfies this National Standard 4
test.
When applying the second standard to an FMP, otherwise referred to
as a comparative benefits test, the guidelines did not require that no group
be disadvantaged. In fact, the guidelines recognized that the disadvantag-
ing of one group is inherent in any fishery allocation. The guidelines
establish a balancing test, which provided that an allocation "may impose
a hardship on one group if it is outweighed by the total benefits received
by another group or groups. 79 An allocation need not preserve the status
quo to qualify as fair and equitable "if a restructuring of fishing privileges
would maximize overall benefits."8" In this regard, it was not necessary
to show that the allocation was the only fair and equitable choice. Not
78. Id. § 602.14(c)(3)(iv) (1995); § 600.325(c)(3)(iv) (1996).
79. Id. § 602.14(c)(3)(i)(B) (1995); § 600.325(c)(3)(i)(B) (1996).
80. Id.
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only might there be more than one allocation schedule which could be fair
and equitable, but what is fair and equitable might change over time.
IFQ opponents argue that the use of the phrase "all [U.S.] fishermen"
in National Standard 4 prohibits phasing out, terminating, or severely
restricting any user group."' Implicit in this reasoning is the argument that
IFQs are incompatible with National Standard 4 because all fishermen
have a right to participate in a fishery and an IFQ excludes certain
fishermen, or even an entire class of fishermen, from an IFQ fishery. A
survey of how the comparative benefits standard has been applied to the
FMPs examined below shows that if an FMP establishing an IFQ plan has
positive net benefits, the allocation will satisfy National Standard 4's fair
and equitable requirement, even if it eliminates individuals or an entire
user group from the fishery.
i. Gulf of Alaska Groundfish FMP
Amendment 14 to the Gulf of Alaska Groundfish FMP (Amendment 14)
phased out pot fishing and restricted trawling in the groundfish fishery.
Plaintiffs challenged Amendment 14 as inconsistent with National Stan-
dard 4's fair and equitable requirement. Opponents of Amendment 14
argued that it "effectively exclud[ed] pot fishermen and trawlers from this
fishery."' The North Pacific Fishery Management Council justified
Amendment 14, in part, as a response to the adverse social and economic
impacts on hook and line fishermen and on Alaska coastal communities
because -of the shift away from southeastern Alaska processing plants due
to the rapidly increasing harvesting capacity of pot fishermen and trawl-
ers.a Commenting on this justification, the Justice Department found that
"such considerations are relevant and appropriate under the guidelines
interpreting National Standard 4."4 The court found the social and
economic rationale for the FMP consistent with National Standard 4, even
81. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343
(9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-35077) (emphasis added).
82. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
1, Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir.1987) (No. C85-
2279).
83. 50 Fed. Reg. 43,196 (Oct. 25, 1985).
84. Brief for Federal Appellee at 37, Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831
F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. C85-2279).
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though the complete phase-out of the pot fishery and the substantial
restrictions on the trawlers might have "some discriminatory impact."'
ii. Atlantic Bilfish FMP
In National Fisheries Institute, Inc. v. Mosbacher, the plaintiffs
challenged the Atlantic Billfish FMP, which effectively closed the Atlantic
Ocean and Gulf of Mexico commercial Billfish fishery. The National
Fisheries Institute argued that the exclusive allocation to recreational
fishermen was "fundamentally incompatible with the 'fair and equitable'
criterion."s6 The Justice Department responded by stating that the plain-
tiffs' argument was without merit because: "As National Standard 4 makes
clear, fishing is a privilege, not a vested right."' Against the factual
backdrop of eliminating commercial fishermen from the fishery, the court
stated that "[m]erely because these provisions have a greater impact on
one type of gear user or group of fishermen does not necessarily mean
that they violate National Standard 4. 88
iii. Coastal Migratory Pelagic Resources FMP
Plaintiffs challenged a ban on drift gillnets in the Atlantic king mackerel
and coastal pelagic fishery contained in Amendment 3 to the Coastal
Migratory Pelagic Resources FMP in C&W Fish Company v. Fox. 9
Similar to prior National Standard 4 challenges, plaintiffs argued that the
ban was not fair and equitable, because "[i]t does not provide equitable
access to the resource among competing user groups. Instead, it elimi-
nates one user group altogether. "90 Additionally, plaintiffs argued there
were sufficient quantities of fish for all user groups, and that the banned
85. 831 F.2d at 1460.
86. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 52, National Fisheries Inst., Inc. v.
Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 88-3103 CRR).
87. Federal Defendant's Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 61, National Fisheries Inst., Inc. v.
Mosbacher, 732 F.
Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 88-3103CRR).
88. 732 F. Supp. at 225.
89. 745 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1990).
90. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment at 48, C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 745 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 90-
1123).
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drift gillnetters could be accommodated in the fishery without adversely
affecting the harvest share of other user groups.9'
In considering the fair and equitable issue, the court found the following
facts:
A significant portion of [C&W Fish Company's] business is devoted
to trade in Atlantic king mackerel and it reports that it is heavily
dependent on vessels using drift gillnets for its supply of king
mackerel.... Plaintiff Inlet Fisheries, Inc.... reports that Atlantic
king mackerel represents 30%-40% of its product. It states that 70%
of its purchases of Atlantic king mackerel come from the drift gillnet
fleet. . . . Plaintiffs James Jeffrey Allman and Bruce Stiller are
commercial fishermen who use drift gillnet gear in their busi-
ness. '. . . Allman reports that between April and October, there is
no other fishery in which his boat can profitably engage ...
[Stiller] reports that there is no other fishery in which his vessel can
readily and economically be utilized .... Both men state that their
economic livelihood will be jeopardized if the Challenged Rule
remains in effect.'
Despite this finding of fact, the court approved the FMP concluding, with-
out explanation, that the FMP allocation was supported by the record.93
iv. Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog IFQs
On June 14, 1990, the Secretary issued regulations implementing
Amendment 8 to the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog FMP.' This
Amendment replaced a limited access permit system for surf clams in the
mid-Atlantic region with an IFQ system. 5 Amendment 8 also extended
the IFQ system to the New England surf clam fishery and to the ocean
quahog fishery.96
91. Id. at 48-49.
92. C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 745 F. Supp. at 7.
93. Idl
94. 55 Fed. Reg. 24,184 (1990).
95. Under the limited access program, the fishery was initially restricted to 184 vessels
although this number declined as vessels left the fishery. Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762
F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (D.D.C. 1991).
96. Id.
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Sea Watch International challenged the IFQ plan on several grounds,
including alleged violations of National Standard 4's fair and equitable
requirement. The salient component of plaintiffs' fair and equitable
argument was that Amendment 8 had no conservation basis and was
intended to drive single vessel owners and small fleet owners from the
fishery.97 Plaintiffs based their argument on an economic analysis of the
practical effects of the IFQ allocations on single vessel and small fleet
operators. The court did not directly address the conservation basis
argument, but rather summarily dismissed plaintiffs' National Standard 4
argument by citing 50 C.FR. § 602.14(c)(3)(i), which stated that "[i]nher-
ent in an allocation is the advantaging of one group to the detriment of
another. 98
v. Halibut and Sablefish IFQs
Following the Secretary's approval of an FMP establishing IFQs for the
halibut and sablefish fisheries off the coast of Alaska,99 fishermen who
saw a diminished opportunity to harvest halibut and sablefish mounted a
judicial challenge."° Alliance Against IFQs complained that the halibut
and sablefish plan structured initial IFQ allocations in such a manner that
vessel captains and crew members, who were not also owners or lessees,
were ineligible for an initial IFQ allocation. Even though crew members
and skippers could purchase IFQs after the initial allocation, plaintiffs
asserted the IFQ was "not fair and equitable to all fishermen" in that
certain classes of fishermen were excluded from the initial allocation.'
0
'
Plaintiffs' argued that any IFQ fails the fair and equitable requirement
unless each class of participants shares in the fishery allocation.'02
The court began its analysis by stating that allocating all IFQ shares to
owners and lessees, and none to crew, appeared to violate "the statutory
97. [Pearson] Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 34, 39, Sea Watch
Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1991) (No. 90-1616, 90-1626).
98. Sea Watch Int'l. v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. at 378.
99. 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375 (1993).
100. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65
U.S.L.W. 3518 (1997).
101. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343
(9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-35077).
102. Id. at 14-17.
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command of fairness and equity to 'all' the fishermen." 3 However, the
court followed this statement by stating that National Standard 4 cannot
be considered in isolation, and that the national standards have competing
and conflicting objectives.' 4 The court found the Secretary has the duty
not only to be fair and equitable, but also to prevent overfishing, promote
conservation, promote efficiency, minimize costs, and achieve other
criteria. 5 The court concluded there was a tension and inconsistency
among these objectives which "necessarily requires that each goal be
sacrificed to some extent to meeting the others."0 6
After determining that National Standard 4 cannot be considered in
isolation, the court relied upon the guidelines interpretation of National
Standard 4 to reject the plaintiffs' argument."°7 The court stated that
"[t]he Secretary is allowed.., to sacrifice the interests of some groups
of fishermen, for the benefit as the Secretary sees it of the fishery as a
whole."' The court's opinion demonstrates that an IFQ plan need not
provide initial quota shares to every class of fishermen.
vi. NOAA General Counsel Opinion
The preceding judicial decisions are also fully consistent with the
NOAA General Counsel's broad interpretation of the term "fair and
103. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d at 348.
104. Id. at 349-50.
105. Id. at 349.
106. Id.
107. Id at 349-50 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 602.14(c)). The guidelines interpreting National
Standard 4 state:
An allocation of fishing privileges may impose a hardship on one group if it is
outweighed by the total benefits received by another group or groups. An allocation
need not preserve the status quo in the fishery to qualify as fair and equitable, if a
restructuring of fishing privileges would maximize overall benefits.
50 C.F.R. § 602.14(c) (1995), removed by 61 Fed. Reg. 32,577 (1996), recodified at 50
C.F.R. § 600.325(c), see 61 Fed. Reg. 32,538, 32,552 (1996).
108. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d at 350 (citing Alaska Factory Trawler
Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court's view that the national
standards have competing objectives which require balancing is validated by the legislative
history of the Sustainable Fisheries Act. The Senate Report explaining an amendment to
National Standard 5 states: "The goal of this amendment is not to eliminate efficiency as a
consideration in the development of plans and regulations, but rather to ensure that it is
balanced with the requirements of other national standards." S. REP. No. 104-276, at 13
(1996).
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equitable." In considering the Texas closure under the Gulf Shrimp FMP,
the NOAA General Counsel rendered an opinion stating:
The phrase "fair and equitable" in section 301(a)(4)(A) is not defined
in the [Magnuson-Stevens Act] or elaborated on in the legislative
history. While it is susceptible of countless interpretations, we
suggest that the measure meet, at a minimum, the following standard:
the allocation must have a rational basis and must not impose a
hardship on one group disproportionate to the benefits received by
another group. 109
Thus, the courts and NOAA concur as to the meaning of National
Standard 4's fair and equitable requirement.
vii. Analysis
A thorough review of National Standard 4 reveals that the essence of
the fair and equitable inquiry for an IFQ plan is whether the allocation
furthers legitimate plan objectives or assists in achieving optimum yield
and whether the benefits received by one user group are sufficiently great
to justify the hardship placed on another user group. 1 IFQs, even
management-based IFQs, are likely to pass muster under the fair and
equitable prong of National Standard 4 if the FMP record demonstrates
that the benefits outweigh its burdens and that the IFQ is consistent with
the Act's purposes and policy.
b. IFQs and the Promotion of Conservation
The second requirement of National Standard 4 is that any allocation,
including an IFQ, must be "reasonably calculated to promote conserva-
tion." ' IFQ opponents might seize on this language to demand a
biological basis for an IFQ plan. However, conservation has been
assigned an expansive meaning, which even a management based IFQ
109. 89 Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, NOAA 8 (May 29, 1980).
110. A related issue is whether an allocation can be fair and equitable if it is not the least
restrictive alternative. Although raised with respect to a few FMPs, only one court has
addressed this question. That court stated the Secretary "does not need to demonstrate that
[the selected alternative] is the least restrictive alternative available. " Alaska Factory
Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d at 1460.
111. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(4)(B) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
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plan can satisfy. Before their deauthorization, the guidelines stated that
"[a]n allocation scheme may promote conservation by encouraging a
rational, more easily managed use of the resource. Or it may promote
conservation (in the sense of wise use) by optimizing the yield, in terms
of size, value, market mix, price, or economic or social benefit of the
product.""' The sweeping interpretation given to the term "conservation"
is further supported by the NOAA General Counsel's Opinion regarding
the Gulf Shrimp Plan's Texas closure. NOAA General Counsel deter-
mined that the closure satisfied National Standard 4's conservation
requirement because the shutdown of the Texas shrimp fishery optimized
yield in terms of size, value and market mix. Thus, purely economic and
social benefits were deemed "conservation."113
Given the broad interpretation of the term "conservation," IFQ pro-
grams that satisfy the test set forth in the guidelines will satisfy the
conservation requirement on National Standard 4.
c. Avoidance of Excessive Shares Under an IFQ System
The final inquiry in determining. if an allocation satisfies National
Standard 4 is whether it grants any person or entity an excessive share of
fishing privileges. Plaintiffs in Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher raised this
issue in the challenge to the surf clam and ocean quahog IFQ plan.114
Plaintiffs alleged that the plan would concentrate 40% of the annual catch
quota for ocean quahogs in two fishermen.115 The court noted the 40%
number "does give pause" but found the Act has no definition of the term
"excessive shares" and that the Secretary's judgment of what is excessive
"deserves weight." 6 With that, the court dismissed plaintiffs' argument.
In light of the absence of a regulatory standard defining what is an
excessive share, it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which an
IFQ plan distributing quota shares among a relatively large number of
fishermen would run afoul of this portion of National Standard 4.
112. 50 C.F.R. § 602.14(c)(3)(ii) (1995), removed by 61 Fed. Reg. 32,577(1996),
recodifiedat 50 C.F.R. § 600.325(c)(3)(ii), see 61 Fed. Reg. 32,538, 32,553 (1996).
113. 89 Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, NOAA 9 (May 29, 1980).
114. 762 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D.D.C. 1991).
115. Id
116. Id.
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2. National Standard 5
National Standard 5 contains two independent elements requiring
separate analysis. The first component addresses efficiency in the
utilization of resources, while the second portion prohibits measures
whose sole purpose is economic allocation. It is this second element that
is at issue in IFQ litigation and raises the question of whether IFQs per se
fail National Standard 5's prohibition on an FMP having "economic
allocation as [its] only purpose." By its very terms, National Standard 5
only prohibits allocations based exclusively on economics. If an FMP
blends economic objectives with management, social, or biological
objectives, it is immediately outside the reach of National Standard 5."7
An FMP, however, may have economic allocation objectives so long
as they are not the only objectives. For example, Amendment 1418 had
several objectives including: (1) ensuring the equitable distribution of
access to the sablefish resource among different gear types, (2) reducing
the negative economic impacts on local communities which are relatively
more dependent on the fishery, (3) limiting the concentration of incompat-
ible effort in certain areas, thereby reducing gear conflicts and grounds
preemption, and (4) preventing or slowing the development of excess
capacity in the sablefish fishery."9 Only the first objective contemplated
an economic allocation. The other three objectives were directed at
reducing social dislocations and slowing the rapid growth of effort in the
fishery. The Secretary and the court approved Amendment 14, despite
the presence of one economic allocation objective."'
117. 50 C.F.R. § 602.15(e) (1995), removed by 61 Fed. Reg. 32,577(1996) recodified
at 50 C.F.R. § 600.330(e), see 61 Fed. Reg. 32,538, 32,553 (1996). The guidelines stated
that National Standard 5:
[P]rohibits only those measures that distribute fishery resources among fishermen on
the basis of economic factors alone, and that have economic allocation as their only
purpose. Where conservation and management measures are recommended that
would change the economic structure of the industry or the economic conditions under
which the industry operates, the need for such measures must be justified in light of
the biological, ecological, and social objectives of the FMP as well as the economic
objectives.
Id.
118. See supra Part III.C.l.a.i.
119. 50 Fed. Reg. 43,193, 43,196 (1985).
120. See supra Part III.C.l.a.i.
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The legislative history of National Standard 5, however, has created
some confusion regarding its interpretation. The economic allocation
portion of National Standard 5 was added to the Act on the floor of the
Senate by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). Senator Stevens described the
amendment as follows:
The intent of this amendment is to make certain that those manage-
ment and conservation measures shall not be for the sole purpose of
economic allocation of the fishery resources. We have no such
intent.
In effect, I am saying that a regional council could not, for example,
say that only vessels over a certain size can fish for one species, and
only those under another size for another species.
We have no intention to permit the regional council to have economic
authority over fishery resources. They are to have conservation and
environmental authority, but not economic."'
Senator Stevens's statement that "[w]e have no intention to permit the
regional council to have economic authority over fishery resources" is
difficult to reconcile considering the multiple sections of the Act which
contemplate the economic effects of management plans."
Contemplating the dichotomy between the Senator's words and the
other provisions of the Act, NOAA General Counsel observed:
Perhaps the best way to fit National Standard 5 into the rest of the
[Magnuson-Stevens Act] is to construe it to prohibit only those
measures which distribute fishery resources among U.S. fishermen,
which base such distribution on economic factors alone, and which
have economic allocation as their only purpose."
121. 122 CONG. REc. 685 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1976) (statement of Sen. Stevens),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 345.
122. Such sections discuss economic factors in optimum yield, development of
underutilized fisheries, limited access, FMPs which take into account social and economic
needs of the states, and a national program to ensure employment, food supply, and revenue.
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801, 1853 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
123. 89 Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, NOAA 10 (May 29, 1980).
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NOAA's interpretation of National Standard 5 was further supported by
the court in Alaska Factory Trawler Association v. Baldridge.124 The
court in Sea Watch International also recognized that National Standard
5 only prohibits FMPs whose sole purpose is economic allocation. The
court found that there was no violation of National Standard 5 because
"[w]here the Secretary considered and relied upon . . . noneconomic
objectives when reviewing and promulgating regulations, there is no
violation of National Standard 5."'25 Sea Watch International is particu-
larly instructive because the plaintiffs challenged the IFQ system for ocean
quahogs on the ground that its sole purpose was economic allocation.
Plaintiffs asserted that the written justification for the FMP was devoid of
any biological or social objectives.126 In rejecting plaintiffs' argument,
the court determined that the administrative record for the FMP did show
the Secretary's concern for the biological impact of fishing pressure
shifting from the restricted surf clam fishery to the ocean quahog
fishery-a non-economic issue. 127
Based upon these interpretations of National Standard 5, an IFQ will
survive a legal challenge if it is reasonably justified on grounds other than
simply making an economic allocation.
3. National Standard 8
National Standard 8, added to the Act by the Sustainable Fisheries Act,
could be used by IFQ proponents to further demonstrate the compatibility
of management based IFQs with the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The new
Standard provides:
Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the
conservation requirements of this Act (including the prevention of
overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account
the importance of fishery resources to the fishing community in order
124. 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987). In the opinion, the court states: "The record
shows that the Secretary considered several non-economic objectives in promulgating the
regulations and that the measure was not adopted solely for economic reasons. In
consequence, the Secretary could reasonably conclude that Amendment 14 does not violate
National Standard 5 .... " Id.
125. Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D.D.C. 1991).
126. Id.; Memorandum of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 24, Sea
Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1991).
127. 762 F. Supp. at 380.
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to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities,
and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize the adverse economic
impacts on such communities."
Discussed below are the two requirements imposed by National Standard
8 and the arguments that may arise in future IFQ litigation.
a. Sustained Participation of Fishing Communities
The first portion of National Standard 8 allows IFQ proponents to rely
on the economic and social interests of entities such as processors and
coastal communities to justify an IFQ plan. The term "fishing community"
used in National Standard 8 is essential to the arguments of IFQ propo-
nents. The Act defined the term as "a community which is substantially
dependent on or substantially engaged in the harvest or processing of
fishery resources to meet social and economic needs, and includes fishing
vessel owners, operators, and crew and United States fish processors that
are based in such community.""' Under this definition, processors who
are hiring, or even importing into the community, additional labor to
handle the glut of fish landings associated with an overcapitalized, short
season, open access fishery could argue that an IFQ plan is consistent with
National Standard 8 because it allows for continuous sustained local
employment versus seasonal surges in employment. Managing the fishery
to permit a more continuous use of processing facilities would also reduce
operational costs and minimize expenses associated with freezing and
storing fish which cannot be absorbed by the market all at once. The
economic and social fabric of coastal communities may also be advantaged
by an IFQ plan because processing employment and worker income may
be more consistent, as it would not be limited to the needs associated with
a shortened fishing season. Furthermore, under an IFQ plan, community
infrastructure systems and services may no longer be stretched to deal
with an influx of workers from other areas who are hired to meet surge
processing needs. Despite these arguments, IFQ opponents may argue
that the term fishing community includes all classes of fishermen, includ-
ing vessel owners, operators and crew, and that any IFQ which excludes
one class from the fishery violates National Standard 8. The burden
128. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
129. Id. § 1802(16).
32 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:5
imposed by National Standard 8 is to "take into account" the needs of the
fishing community and to minimize adverse impacts "to the extent
practicable." As discussed below, the existing precedent interpreting the
Act does not support the argument likely to be advanced by IFQ oppo-
nents.
In Sea Watch International v. Mosbacher, plaintiffs complained that the
Secretary failed to comply with § 1853(b)(6) of the Act which requires the
Secretary to "take into account" certain factors when establishing a limited
access system. 30 The court said that as long as the Secretary had
"considered" these factors, § 1853(b)(6) was satisfied and "the Court may
not second-guess the accuracy of the balance struck" after these factors
were considered.13' An identical result was reached in Alliance Against
IFQs v. Brown' where plaintiffs alleged § 1853(b)(6) violations because
the Secretary allegedly failed to take into account present participation in
the fishery. The court found that the Secretary indeed "considered" this
issue and made a decision which was not arbitrary and capricious. 133
Thus, if "take into account" means to consider, then National Standard 8
is transformed into a procedural standard, requiring only that the adminis-
trative record demonstrate that the interests were given full consideration
and that a rational basis exists for the choices made.
b. Minimizing Adverse Economic Impacts on Fishing
Communities, 'To the Extent Practicable"
National Standard 8's admonition to minimize adverse impacts is
preceded by two modifying clauses. The standard applies both a "take
into account the importance of fishery resources to the fishing
community"'34 modifier and a "to the extent practicable" limitation. 3
5
When considering whether an IFQ plan minimizes adverse economic
impacts on fishing communities, IFQ plan proponents will have a ready
defense in National Standard 8 if there are competing concerns that do not
make it "practicable" to minimize impacts.
130. Id. § 1853(b)(6).
131. Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. at 379.
132. 84 F.3d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1997).
133. Id. at 347-48.
134. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
135. Id.
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Opponents of future IFQ plans may argue that the words "to the extent
practicable" impose a burden on the Council and the Secretary to take
every practicable step to minimize adverse economic impacts on each
segment of the fishing community. This argument, however, ignores the
framework of National Standard 8 which states that the Secretary is only
required to "take into account" the importance of fishery resources to
fishing communities so as to minimize adverse economic impacts "to the
extent practicable."'3 6
Opponents may also argue that National Standard 8 recognizes that an
FMP may cause adverse impacts and, therefore, the burden on the
Secretary is to consider these impacts and to achieve a rational compro-
mise. However, in Alaska Factory Trawler Association v. Baldridge,
plaintiffs made the related argument that there were other alternatives
which were fairer and more equitable under National Standard 4 and that
the national standards required the Secretary to select the least restrictive
alternative.' 37 The court rejected this argument stating that the Secretary
"does not need to demonstrate that the [selected alternative] is the least
restrictive alternative available."038  Finally, IFQ proponents may also
argue that an IFQ plan that excludes certain classes of individuals from a
fishery is, nevertheless, consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
because there must be a balancing of competing interests under the
different national standards and if the comparative benefits of the plan
outweigh its detriments then the economic impacts are minimized. 139
While this new standard creates additional consistency requirements for
FMPs, existing legal precedent and the language of the standard indicate
that the standard supports the legality of IFQ plans.
136. Id.
137. Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. Id.
139. Support for this argument can be found in Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown wherein
the court said that an IFQ plan which might appear to violate one national standard could
nevertheless be approved under the Act because the Act requires a balancing of the
competing objectives of different National Standards. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84
F.3d 343, 348 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1997). Therefore, something
which might not be approved if considered in isolation could be approved under the
balancing test.
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4. National Standard 9
National Standard 9, another new standard added to the Magnuson-
Stevens Act by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, seeks to avoid the traditional
problems associated with an overcapitalized open access fishery. In such
a fishery, fishermen engage in a race to harvest the fish during a short-
ened fishing season and often do not take the time to minimize the bycatch
of non-target species or the harvest of sublegal size members of the target
species. An overcapitalized open access fishery rewards the swift. There
is a disincentive to take time away from harvesting the target species so
as to minimize the bycatch of non-target species. In a situation such as in
the halibut fishery, where openings were limited to twenty-four hours,
fishermen were driven to harvest as rapidly as possible, setting out more
gear than could reasonably be retrieved when the season was over in an
attempt to maximize their harvest potential." When the fishing period
was completed, the excess gear was cut loose and continued to "ghost
fish." IFQs are one means, but certainly not the only way, of stopping
the race to harvest. Where the administrative record establishes that a
proposed IFQ plan will reduce bycatch and associated mortality, a
reviewing court will be hard pressed to find the plan inconsistent with
National Standard 9. Nevertheless, IFQ plan opponents might argue that
National Standard 9 imposes a requirement to minimize bycatch and
associated mortality "to the extent practicable" and that it is practicable to
implement another alternative which would more effectively reduce
bycatch. 14
1
Although the legislative history of the Sustainable Fisheries Act does
not explain the proper meaning of the term "to the extent practicable"
which is used in each new national standard and discussed previously,
some inferences can be drawn. The House version of National Standard
9 originally provided that: "Conservation and management measures
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize bycatch.' 42 Simi-
larly, in amending those provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act detailing
the required components of FMPs, the House-passed bill required that an
140. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
141. This argument is the reverse of the least restrictive alternative argument discussed
with respect to National Standard 8 because here opponents of IFQs would be arguing that
the clause "to the extent practicable" imposes a requirement to select the more stringent
alternative. See supra Part III.C.3.
142. H.R. REP. No. 104-171, at 4 (1995).
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FMP "include conservation and management measures necessary to
minimize byeatch to the maximum extent practicable."143 However, other
sections of the House bill omitted the word "maximum.""
The House of Representatives apparently saw a distinction between the
burden imposed by the standard "to the maximum extent practicable" and
the burden imposed by "to the extent practicable." Deletion of the word
"maximum!' from the Sustainable Fisheries Act suggests that Congress did
not intend to impose upon the Councils and the Secretary the burden of
selecting the alternative that does the most to achieve a reduction in
byeatch. Thus, a reasonable argument can be made that the phrase "to the
extent practicable" allows a balancing of what may be competing fishery
conservation and management interests.
Furthermore, "to the extent practicable" can be interpreted to require a
balancing of interests because some FMP measures are impracticable.
This view is supported by the explanation in the House Report regarding
the meaning of the requirement "to the maximum extent practicable,
minimize bycatch." The House Report clearly states that this language
requires that byeatch be minimized, "not eliminated." 45 Congress viewed
the standard "to the maximum extent practicable" as requiring some
balancing to determine practicality. Deletion of the word "maximum" in
the enacted law provides even more discretion in this balancing, and if the
balance struck is supported by the administrative record, a court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.
5. National Standard 10
In the race to the fish associated with an overcapitalized open access
fishery, fishermen are compelled to work during the available fishing
season regardless of weather conditions because there is no other time
during which the fishery may be prosecuted. The result can be vessel
damage and fatalities, a situation which was all too true in the pre-IFQ
.143. Id. at 6.
144. The House bill required that FMPs "to the extent practicable, minimize mortality
caused by economic discards and regulatory discards in the fishery." Id. at 7. Similarly, in
the section listing discretionary provisions which could be included in an FMP, the House-
passed bill allowed the inclusion of conservation and management measures "necessary to
minimize, to the extent practicable, adverse impacts on essential fishery habitat." Id.
145. Id. at 27.
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halibut and sablefish fisheries."4 National Standard 10 intends to avoid
these problems by requiring that FMPs "promote the safety of human life
at sea." '47 An IFQ plan may not be the only way to end the race to the
fish and reduce the threat to life and property, but to the extent the
administrative record demonstrates that the IFQ plan promotes the safety
of human life at sea, it will be found consistent with National Standard 10.
D. Necessary Provisions of Fishery Management Plans
Section 1583(a) of the Act enumerates mandatory FMP provisions.1 '
The Sustainable Fisheries Act added a new provision to § 1583(a)
requiring that FMPs include: "[C]onservation and management measures
that, to the extent practicable and in the following priority-(A) minimize
bycatch; and (B) minimize the mortality of bycatch which cannot be
avoided .... ,,14 As discussed in relation to National Standard 9, it is
likely that IFQ plan proponents will be able to establish a record demon-
strating that IFQ plans minimize bycatch and associated mortality by
eliminating the race to the fish. Plan opponents may raise the issue of the
meaning of the undefined term "to the extent practicable." However, a
court is unlikely to substitute its judgment for that of a Council and the
Secretary if both parties determine, and such determination is supported
by evidence in the record, that an IFQ plan is a reasonable response to a
bycatch issue, particularly given the balancing necessary to comply with
various other requirements of the Act.
The Sustainable Fisheries Act also requires the Secretary and the
Councils to "take into account" the affect of limited access systems on "the
cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery and any affected
146. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW,
INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTA
MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR THE HALIBUT FISHERIES IN THE GULF OF ALASKA AND
BERING SEA, 1-10 (June 1, 1991) [hereinafter DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT]; FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTA MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVE FOR
FIXED GEAR SABLEFISH AND HALIBUT FISHERIES, GULF OF ALASKA AND BERING
SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS, 2-3 (Sept. 15, 1992) [hereinafter FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
147. 16 U.S.C.A. §1851(a)(10) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
148. Id. § 1853(a).
149. Id. § 1853(a)( I1).
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fishery communities.""5° While this language requires an evaluation of the
social and cultural impact of the proposed system, the burden on the
Council and the Secretary is to "take into account" these factors. Again,
as discussed in regard to National Standard 9, the burden imposed by this
requirement is more procedural than substantive. If it can be shown from
the record that these factors were considered and there was a rational
basis for the ultimate decision, a reviewing court is likely to uphold the
plan.
Another new section to the Act provides that in approving any IFQ
plan,' the Councils and the Secretary are required to "consider" the
recommendations contained in a report on IFQs to be completed by the
National Academy of Sciences by October 1, 1998, and must "ensure" that
any IFQ plan: (1) establishes procedures and requirements for review of
the plan; (2) provides for effective enforcement, including adequate
observers, (3) allows for fees of up to three percent of the ex-vessel value
of fish to recover actual costs directly related to enforcement and manage-
ment of the plan, (4) provides for a fair and equitable initial allocation, (5)
prevents any person from acquiring an excessive share of IFQs, and (6)
considers the allocation of a portion of the annual harvest to entry level
fishermen, small vessel owners and crew members who do not hold or
qualify for IFQs.' Not only do these standards demonstrate congressio-
nal approval of IFQs, but it can be argued they implicitly approve IFQ
plans that do not provide an initial allocation to all segments of the
"fishing community." If exclusions for an entire class of fishermen were
not contemplated as a possibility, it would have been unnecessary for
Congress to require the Councils and the Secretary to "consider" setting
aside a portion of the harvest for certain classes. Furthermore, the
congressional mandate only requires that the Council and the Secretary
"consider" the recommendations of the report.
E. Conclusion
Statutory language, legislative history, and applicable judicial precedent
suggest that plaintiffs challenging IFQ plans will be hard pressed to find
150. Id. § 1853(b)(6)(E).
151. The Sustainable Fisheries Act also amended the Act to prohibit the development
or approval of any new IFQ plan before October 1, 2000. Id § 1853(d)(1).
152. Id. § 1853(d)(5).
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purely legal arguments to support their case, even if a plan is justified
only on a management basis. In the wake of the Sustainable Fisheries
Act, it appears to be even more certain that IFQs are a viable and legal
fisheries management plan option. Despite the legality of IFQs, if the
administrative record supporting an IFQ plan is deficient, IFQ plan
opponents will be able to assert failed compliance with the Act.
IV. IFQS AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL:
DO THEY ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION OBJECTIVES?
The opposite of an IFQ fishery is an open access fishery in which
anyone and everyone can participate. Profitable open access fisheries
attract continuing investment and such fisheries drift into a situation
whereby a fisherman's harvest depends on whether that fisherman can fish
faster than the next person-thereby creating an incentive to build newer,
bigger, and more expensive fishing vessels or to utilize higher capacity
equipment."' An overcapitalized open access fishery favors the swift, not
necessarily those who use the allowable harvest most productively. The
all-too-frequent outcome of a profitable open-access fishery is that the
number of participating vessels increase, average vessel size increases,
output per vessel declines, the fishing season shortens, and profits are
squeezed.
Although this may be a worst case scenario, it is not without precedent
and raises the question of whether IFQs are a necessary and effective tool
to address such situations or prevent them from occurring. This section
of the Article answers this question by reviewing and analyzing the three
fisheries in which IFQs have been established: the North Pacific halibut
and sablefish fisheries, the Mid-Atlantic and New England surf clam and
ocean quahog fisheries, and the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery.
153. There is also an incentive to hire larger crews to fish faster, purchase and carry
redundant gear to avoid delays caused by broken gear, put as much gear in the water as
possible to maximize the harvest, not handle the fish as carefully as might otherwise be done
for product quality because that takes away time from maximizing the harvest, not carefully
release prohibited species because that too takes time, not take time to fish so as to reduce
the bycatch of non-target species, fish in whatever weather conditions exist when the fishing
season is open, pressure decisionmakers to make more fish available for harvest, and forego
opportunities to participate in other fisheries if those fisheries occur during the open access
fishing derby.
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A. Survey of IFQ Fisheries:
Before and After the IFQ Fishery Management Plan
1. The Halibut And Sablefish IFQ Plan
The structural changes in the halibut and sablefish fisheries which lead
to the IFQ plan illustrate the problems which can plague an open access
fishery. In 1984, 49.3% of the vessels fishing for halibut were under
thirty-six feet and they landed 13.7% of the catch. By 1990, only 39.5%
of the vessels were under thirty-six feet but they landed only 8.4 % of the
harvest. At the same time, vessels in the thirty-six foot to fifty-five foot
class more than doubled in number while their average catch declined
twenty-three percent. Vessels in excess of fifty-six feet almost tripled in
number but the catch per vessel declined thirty-eight percent. The impact
of this enormous growth in fishing power was reflected in ever shorter
fishing seasons. In Area 3A, which typically comprises the bulk of the
halibut harvest, the season declined from forty seven days in 1977 to three
days in 1990.154
For sablefish, the pattern was the same. Only eighty-nine vessels
participated in the fishery in 1981. In 1985, there were 337 vessels
harvesting sablefish and NMFS determined that domestic harvesting
capacity was large enough to catch the entire allowable harvest. By 1988,
there were 723 vessels in the fishery. As with halibut, the effect was ever
shorter fishing seasons. In 1984, the season in the four principal fishing
areas lasted 180, 244, 254, and 366 days respectively. By 1989, sablefish
seasons in those areas lasted only 16, 46, 56, and 103 days. 55
Operating in shorter seasons, fishermen were setting as much gear as
possible, inevitably resulting in tangled and lost gear. In one area,
fishermen reported gear being overlaid by as many as three other sets of
gear. In 1989 alone, the number of skates"5 6 increased up to 100% from
154. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at 1-7, 5-1 to -2.
155. NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT CoUNCIL, LONGLINE AND POT GEAR
SABLEFISH MANAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF ALASKA AND THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN
ISLANDS, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENviRoNMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND REGULATORY
IMPACT REVIEW/INITIAL REGULATORY FLEX[BILriY ANALYSIS TO THE FISHERY MANAGE-
MENT PLANS FOR THE GULF OF ALASKA AND THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 30, 34
(Nov. 16, 1989) [hereinafter LONGLINE AND POT GEAR SABLEFISH MANAGEMENT].
156. A skate is an array oflongline fishing gear.
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1987, and almost every sablefish fishermen reported losing between ten
and thirty skates due to overcrowded fishing grounds.157
The result of setting as much gear as possible was that not all of it could
be retrieved when the fishery was open for only twenty-four hours at a
time. Unretrieved fishing lines were cut loose and began "ghost" fishing,
thereby creating conservation problems.1"8 The International Pacific
Halibut Commission (IPHC) estimated that the 1,860 skates lost in the
1990 halibut fishery killed approximately two million pounds of halibut
valued at $2.4-$4.0 million.'5 9
The race to the fish also provided an economic disincentive for impor-
tant conservation actions. For example, the IPHC estimated that over one
million pounds of sublegal halibut were killed in the 1990 halibut fishery
because fishermen did not take the time to safely unhook and discard the
fish."6 The open access fishery caused approximately seven million tons
of rockfish with an ex-vessel price of $1.7-$2.9 million to be discarded.
The lost opportunity cost of taking the time to retain or safely discard this
bycatch was too high to make the preservation of the fish profitable. The
mortality rate for discarded rockfish was almost 100% .61
The rush to take the available harvest in an overcapitalized open access
fishery can also make it difficult for fishery managers to prevent fisher-
men from exceeding the allowable harvest. Short fishing seasons do not
allow adequate time to find out just how much gear is being set and to
react to the quantity of gear set. Thus, between 1980 to 1990, the halibut
quota in Areas 3A and 3B was exceeded in eight of these ten years.162 In
1990, the halibut quota was exceeded in five of the eight fishing areas, in
one case by 208 %. 63 Sablefish harvesters surpassed the allowable limit
in every area in the Gulf of Alaska in every quarter from 1986 through
1990, with the exception of one quarter in a single area.'
14
157. LONGLINE AND POT GEAR SABLEFISH MANAGEMENT, supra note 155, at 9.
158. Id.
159. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at
2-6 to 2-7.
160. Id. at 2-14.
161. Id. at2-13.
162. Id. at 5-18 tbl.5.3.3.
163. Id. at 2-61 tbl.2.7.
164. NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND ALASKA FISHERIES SCIENCE
CENTER, DRAFT REVISED SUPPLEMENT TO THE DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT AND REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW/INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS FOR THE GROUNDFISH FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR THE GULF OF ALASKA
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Generally, as seasons shorten in an open access fishery, fishermen must
fish regardless of the weather conditions and must work longer hours at
a faster pace. In the halibut fishery, during the first twenty-four hour
opening of the 1991 season, four vessels and three lives were lost.16
Between 1991 and 1994, a total of eleven fatalities occurred."6 An
independent study by the National Research Council confirmed that the
short and inflexible halibut openings were forcing fishermen to work
under extremely adverse conditions.'67
The race to capture as much fish as possible in the shortest amount of
time also had a measurable impact on product quality. Since more fishing
gear was being set than could reasonably be retrieved, hooked fish stayed
on the bottom longer and were exposed to sea lice and predators. To
increase fishing speed, some fishermen devoted less crew time to heading
and gutting fish. Uncut fish suffer more rapid quality degradation.
Sablefish and halibut fishermen, processors, and retailers all reported
quality problems with the catch. 168 Furthermore, as vessels congregated
to unload after the truncated fishing season, the quality and freshness of
fish off-loaded at the end of the line was inferior to the fish unloaded at
the beginning. All of these factors diminished the overall quality of the
product and the price offered the fisherman, the processor and the retailer
reflected this fact. 69
Like the fishermen and consumers, processors suffered under the open
access fishing derby. The market could not absorb the product glut,
negatively impacting prices. Processors were forced to bear the added
costs of cold storage, including interest and associated carrying costs. 7
Inflexible delivery schedules also prohibited processors from selecting
schedules that could reduce overall operating costs. Moreover, uncertain-
AND THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS LONGLINE AND POT GEAR SABLEFISH MANAGE-
MENT IN THE GULF OF ALASKA AND THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (May 13, 1991).
165. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at 1-10.
166. Letter from Jennifer M. Lincoln, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, to Donna Parker, Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development
(Sept. 9, 1996) (on file with Author).
167. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at
2-3.
168. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at 1-11; FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146, at 1-9.
169. LONGLINE AND POT GEAR SABLEFISH MANAGEMENT, supra note 155, at 1-11.
170. See FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 146,
at 2-6.
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ties regarding the supply of fish, and the resulting inability to plan for
orderly and consistent processing made long-term investment and planning
very difficult.'71 Furthermore, the glut of fish caused by the status quo
derby caused processors to produce products giving them the greatest
revenue per hour, while they discarded others. A slower and steadier
supply of raw product would have permitted the processors to use
facilities and workers to process lower value product, thereby increasing
efficiency and product variety.172 In order to rectify the situation, the
North Pacific Fishery Management Council turned to IFQs in 1993.
In September 1996, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
reviewed the effects of the plan, which was first implemented in 1995.
Although complete data were not available, the preliminary data showed
that the IFQ plan was successfully achieving its objectives.
With respect to the overcapacity problem, the number of halibut quota
share holders dropped eight to ten percent in Areas 2C, 3A, 3B and 4A
in 1995 and declined three percent in Area 4B. 73 Similarly, the number
of sablefish quota share holders declined from one to seven percent
depending on the fishing area."7 As a result, the size of the average quota
share increased. 75 The number of vessels making landings declined
twenty to forty-five percent from 1994176 in all halibut management areas
except one, where there was a slight increase,"'T and declined or remained
the same in sablefish areas. 178
There were also new entrants into the fisheries. Persons who had not
been eligible for an initial halibut quota share constituted two to nine
171. Id. at 2-12.
172. See id. at 2-6.
173. ALASKA COMMERCIAL FIsHERIEs ENTRY COMMISSION, REPORT No. 96-ION,
ExECuTIvE SuMMARY: CHANGES UNDER ALASKA'S HALIBuT IFQ PROGRAM, 1995, at 4
(1996) [hereinafter REPORT 96-iON]. The halibut and sablefish IFQ plan allocated quota
shares by fishery management area. However, under the allocation formula more people
could qualify for a quota share than had fished in recent years, a fact which will slow the
capacity consolidation process. In Area 2C, for example, an average of 1,635 permit holders
landed halibut from 1990-1994 but 2,378 persons received quota shares. Id.
174. ALASKA COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION, REPORT No. 96-1 IN,
ExECuTIvE SUMMARY: CHANGES UNDER ALASKA'S SABLEFISH IFQ PROGRAM, 1995
[hereinafter REPORT 96-1 IN].
175. Id.
176. REPORT 96-10N, supra note 173, at 14.
177. Id. The numbers exclude the one fishing area where the entire available harvest
was allocated to a community development program. Id.
178. REPORT 96-1 IN, supra note 174, at 15.
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percent of the quota share holders at the end of 1995, depending on the
fishing area, and fifty percent or more of the leased quota shares went to
people who did not initially received a quota share. 79 The pattern was the
same in the sablefish fishery where the percentage of new entrants ranged
from six to ten percent depending on the area."8
In contrast to the pre-IFQ era, the total allowable catch for halibut in
1995 was not exceeded in any of the eight management areas for which
harvest levels were set. 81 In fact, the harvests were only 67.5%-88.7%
of the permitted level." The pattern was the same in the sablefish
fishery, where harvests fell below allowable levels in all management
areas by 7.2%-34.6%.'3
Although incomplete, the collected data suggest additional conservation
improvements. For example, the IPHC estimates halibut mortality from
lost or abandoned fishing gear dropped significantly in 1995 and tentative
estimates of the halibut bycatch also suggest declines.'8 4 No estimate of
the effect of the IFQ plan on groundfish discards is currently available.ss
From the data now available, there is no documented evidence of
highgrading, 16 although it has been talked about anecdotally. Similarly,
the data do not suggest the under reporting of harvest levels that tradition-
ally accompanies highgrading. i"
In regard to product price and quality, a survey of processors revealed
that most were paying higher ex-vessel prices for halibut and sablefish in
1995 and received higher wholesale prices.' Although many processors
felt the IFQ program increased their production costs, they were divided
179. REPORT 96-10N, supra note 173, at 9.
180. REPORT 96-1 IN, supra note 174, at 7.
181. REPORT 96-1ON, supra note 173, at 15. No harvest level was established in
management area 4E which was set aside for the community development program. Id.
182. Id.
183. REPORT 96-1 IN, supra note 174, at 15.
184. Sandra Lowe et al., Executive Summary: Assessment of Conservation Effects of
the Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Programs 2 (1996) (Presented to the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council) (on file with Author).
185. Id.
186. Id at 3. Highgrading is the process of keeping only high value fish and discarding
low value fish.
187. Id.
188. Gunnar Knapp & Dan Hull Executive Summary: The First Year of the Alaska IFQ
Program: A Survey of Halibut and Sablefish Registered Buyers 2(1996) (prepared for the
Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development and the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game) (on file with Author).
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about the effect of this on gross margins for halibut processing. Most
processors, however, did believe that there was a decrease in profit
margins for sablefish. 8 9 Processors also attributed better product quality
to the IFQ program. Furthermore, the share of halibut prepared for the
higher priced fresh fish market increased from eighteen percent in 1994
to thirty-eight percent in 1995.190
A survey of quota share holders confirmed that ex-vessel prices
increased under the IFQ plan. Fishermen who fished for halibut on the
same vessel in 1994 and 1995 reported an average ex-vessel price increase
of $0.18 per pound.' 9 Additionally, average crew size aboard vessels
harvesting halibut declined,"9 as did the costs of gear replacement and
insurance, although the costs of ice and fuel generally increased.' 9 While
this suggests generally lower vessel operational costs and higher returns,
no clear trend emerged regarding crew wages. Of the survey respondents
who fished on the same halibut vessel in 1994 and 1995, fifty-two percent
reported that crew shares remained the same, while twenty-nine percent
said crew shares increased and fourteen percent reported a decline."9
One of the important facts emerging from the fishermen's survey was
that fishermen were adjusting their harvesting plans to account for weather
conditions, fish prices, and opportunities to participate in other
fisheries. 95 Further evidence of increased safety under the IFQ plan was
reflected in the fact that while there were eleven fatalities in the Alaskan
halibut fishery between 1991-1994, there were none in 1995 and none in
1996, as of September 9, 1996.196 The Coast Guard also reported that the
number of search and rescue operations, which totaled twenty-three in
1992, twenty-six in 1993, and thirty-three in 1994, declined to fifteen in
1995.197
189. Id. at 5-6.
190. Id. at5.
191. Id. at 7.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id. at 11.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Id. at 1.
196. Lincoln, supra note 166.
197. Letter from B.I. Merchant, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Maritime
Operations Compliances to Philip I. Smith, Chief, National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska
Region 5 (September 6, 1996) (on file with Author).
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Although preliminary, the data indicate the halibut and sablefish IFQ
plan is achieving its objectives and addressing the problems of the pre-IFQ
open access fishery.
2. Wreckfish
In 1987, the two vessels participating in the wreckfish fishery harvested
only 29,000 pounds of wreckfish 9 8 After the 1987 discovery of wreck-
fish as a substitute for grouper, interest in the fishery skyrocketed and by
1990, seventy to eighty vessels were targeting wreckfish and landings
exceeded four million pounds.199 The allowable harvest, which was only
two million pounds, was exceeded by 100% because of the uncontrolled
race for the fish that developed.'
The rapid expansion in the harvesting sector caused other problems
similar to the sablefish and halibut fisheries. The pressure to fish as
quickly as possible created gear conflicts, including the use of prohibited
bottom longlines. Moreover, fishermen were forced to fish in bad
weather. Fishing also occurred when fish availability was relatively poor,
thereby increasing operating costs. The sudden glut of fish on the market
caused by the race to harvest the allowable catch resulted in little or no
profits on the sale of wreckfish, a situation compounded by the fact that
processors lacked the capacity to absorb the harvest.2"'
Beginning in 1990, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
took steps to address these problems and sought to prevent overfishing.
Harvest levels were restricted to two million pounds, vessels were
required to have a permit to participate in the fishery, trip harvest limits
were imposed, and bottom longlines were prohibited.' Despite these
198. Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,023, 39,024
(1990).
199. Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic, 56 Fed. Reg. 57,302, 57,303
(1991).
200. Id.
201. SOUTH ATLANTc FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL AMENDMENT 5
(WRECKFISH), REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, INrTAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
DETERMINAnON AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FORTHE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR THE SNAPPER-GROUPER FISHERY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION, 9-16 (Sept. 1991).
202. Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,257-58 (1990);
Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic, 56 Fed. Reg. 2443-44 (1991); Snapper-
Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic 56 Fed. Reg. 18,742 (1991); Snapper-Grouper
Fishery of the South Atlantic, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,016 (1991).
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efforts, additional controls were deemed necessary. Limited entry was not
seen as a solution, and an IFQ plan was established in 1992.03
Adoption of the wreckfish IFQ plan has eliminated the overcapacity in
the fishery, reduced gear conflicts, decreased costs per trip, improved
regulatory compliance, and increased the price of wreckfish-all predicted
benefits. Under the IFQ plan, the number of vessels decreased from
ninety-one in 1991 to a near optimum level of twenty-two in 1993.204 The
remaining vessels ceased fishing during the April to June post-spawning
period when fishing is poor and fishermen reduced their effort in order to
avoid higher fishing costs and the safety problems associated with the
early season fishing.20 5 Prior to the wreckfish IFQ, many fishermen
wanted to increase fishing pressure on the stock by raising allowable
harvest levels from two million pounds to between six to eight million
pounds. Now, there is no effort to increase the allowable harvest.'
There is also evidence of increased compliance with the prohibition on
bottom longlines77 In fact, according to government enforcement agents,
fishermen are increasingly willing to provide enforcement tips that
significantly improve enforcement effectiveness. 08 Since adoption of the
IFQ plan, the economics of the fishery have also improved. Wreckfish
prices have increased to approximately $1.85 per pound, which contrasts
with the average monthly price of $0.90-$1.55 per pound in the pre-IFQ
open-access fishery. 9
203. Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic, 57 Fed. Reg. 7886 (1992).
204. John R. Gauvin et al., Description and Evaluation of the Wreckfish Polyprion
Americanus Fishery under Individual Transferable Quotas, 9 MARINE RESOURCE ECON.
99, 107 (1994). It had previously been estimated that the fishery could optimally support
roughly twenty vessels. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 113. In fact, during the first three years of the IFQ plan, the allowable harvest
was not taken. Andrew Brod & William Shobe, The Demand for ITQs: The Puzzle of the
Atlantic Wreckfish Industry, in WORKING PAPERS IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 2 (Univ. of
N.C. Greensboro Working Paper Series No. EC0960201, 1996).
207. John R. Gauvin et al., A Description and Preliminary Evaluation of the Wreckfish
Fishery, Polyprion Americanus, under Individual Transferable Quotas, in MANAGEMENT
OF EXPLOITED FISH 761, 781-84 (Alaska Sea Grant, 1993).
208. Id. at 783.
209. Gauvin, supra note 204, at 112. The most likely explanation for this phenomenon
is that shrimp fishermen with wreckfish IFQ shares were not using their shares but instead
employed their vessels in the more profitable shrimp fishery. Brod & Shobe, supra note
206, at 15-17.
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While the wreckfish IFQ plan is relatively young, the preliminary
analysis suggests that it too is addressing the problems of an open-access
fishery.
3. Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog
The adoption of a 1977 FMP for the surf clam and ocean quahog
fishery recognized the already serious overcapacity in the fishery. The
FMP established a moratorium prohibiting the entry of additional vessels
into the fishery and severely regulated harvest levels."' 0 Despite these
seemingly draconian measures, fishing pressure continued to increase,
because the moratorium, which froze fleet size, did not regulate harvest-
ing capacity. Total surf clam and ocean quahog landings between 1967
and 1974 more than doubled from forty-five million pounds to ninety-
seven million pounds and reached a peak in 1985 of 125 million
pounds.211 At the same time, the number of allowable fishing hours in the
mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery decreased ninety-two percent, from 1,752
in 1978 to 138 in 1986.
Faced with ever increasing fishing pressure, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council instituted a system of quarterly quotas, designated
fishing weeks, and reduced hours in order to control the fishery.21 3
However, the restrictions on fishing time created other problems, specifi-
cally an incentive to maximize total harvests by overharvesting fishing
beds. This practice, in turn, caused a significant increase in the catch of
210. Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Industries, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,438 (1977). In fact, the
overcapacity problem was so great that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council asked
the Secretary to implement the FMP on an emergency basis because the existing fleet could
take the 1978 annual quota in just fifteen days. MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCIL, MED-ATLANTc FISHERY MANAGEMENT CouNcIL FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
ACHIEVEMENTS, 1977-1993-SuRF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG FISHERY MANAGEMENT
PLAN 1,5 (undated) (on file with Author) [hereinafter MID-ATLANTIc COUNCIL REPORT].
211. MID-ATLANIc FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AMENDMENT 8, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE ATLANTIC SURF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG FISHERY 1, 40
(July 1988) (on file with Author).
212. Id. at 43. Although the 1977 limited entry system did not successfully control
fishing capacity, it did limit the magnitude of the potential problem. In the Mid-Atlantic
surf clam fishery, the moratorium finally limited the number of permitted vessels to 142.
In contrast, a moratorium on new entrants was never established in the New England fishery.
In this fishery, NMFS issued 1,192 permits to fish for surf clams and-993 permits for ocean
quahog vessels. 55 Fed. Reg. 3416, 3417 (1990).
213. Id.
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undersized clams since restricted fishing times did not permit vessel
owners to search for beds with larger clams.2 14 In addition, serious safety
concerns developed because of the pressure on vessel owners to fish
during their allotted fishing days, even when weather conditions were
adverse. Finally, the moratorium created another safety concern in that
existing boats could not be replaced unless their predecessors sank, were
destroyed by fire, or became inoperable. When the FMP was promul-
gated, there were a large number of older and less safe vessels operating
in the fishery. 15
Faced with continuing problems in the fishery, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council, in cooperation with the New England Fishery
Management Council, developed the IFQ plan, which was implemented
in the last quarter of 1990.216
There has been relatively little analysis on the effects of the surf clam
and ocean quahog IFQ plan. The limited analysis, however, shows that
by 1992 only sixty-eight vessels were participating in the IFQ surf clam
fishery, down from 133 vessels in 1990.217 The data also show that while
the total harvest remained relatively constant, the catch per vessel
increased. 18 For example, the number of vessels in excess of 100 gross
registered tons participating in the surf clam fishery declined from
seventy-five in 1990 to forty in 1992, while the hours fished increased
from 11,000 to 18,000, and the catch per vessel jumped from 28,000 to
52,000 bushels. 19 These changes suggest general improvement in per
vessel profitability and fleet economics. However, ex-vessel prices have
not significantly improved under the IFQ plan, but rather remain within
the historical range for surf clams and are rising somewhat for quahogs.'
As is the case with the wreckfish IFQ plan and the halibut and sablefish
plan, the surf clam and ocean quahog IFQ plan seems to be addressing at
214. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Strike, In
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and in Support of the
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 962
F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1991) (No. 90-1616; 90-1626).
215. Id. at 11.
216. Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery, 55 Fed. Reg. 3416 (1990), codified
at 50 C.F.R. § 652 (1995), removed by 61 Fed. Reg. 35,011 (1996).
217. Mid-Atlantic Council Report, supra note 210, at 12.
218. Id. at 13-14.
219. Id. at 13.
220. Id. at 14.
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least some of the problems occurring in the pre-IFQ open access fishery.
V. IFQs As A NECESSARY CONSERVATION
AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE
IFQ opponents argue that plans which confer ownership shares are
unnecessary for the conservation and management of a fishery. IFQ
opponents raise three related questions: (1) are individual quotas a useful
management tool for the conservation and management of fishery re-
sources; (2) if so, is it necessary that such quotas confer ownership shares;
and (3) should ownership shares be transferable? The first question was
addressed in Parts I and IV, which demonstrate that IFQ plafis can be a
useful tool for the conservation and management of a fishery, and is
amplified on in this section. This Part of this Article also discusses the
other two questions raised by IFQ opponents.
The right granted by an IFQ is revocable because the Magnuson-
Stevens Act allows a Council and the Secretary to alter an FMP establish-
ing an IFQ.2' It is also settled law that a license to perform an act upon
public lands and waterways does not vest the holder with a permanent
property right which, if revoked, is subject to compensation under the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. For example, in Marine One,
Inc. v. Manatee County,'2 individuals claimed that the revocation of a
permit to build a dock on waters owned by Florida constituted a taking of
property without compensation. The court found that permits to perform
activities on public waters cannot be treated as property for takings
purposes. The court stated: "Both federal and... state cases stand for
the proposition that permits to perform activities on public land-whether
the activity be building, grazing, prospecting, mining or traversing-are
mere licenses whose revocation cannot rise to the level of a Fifth Amend-
ment taking."'m Other courts have also emphasized that licenses and
permits are not private property under the Fifth Amendment finding: "It
is clear that a license does not constitute property for which the Govern-
ment is liable upon condemnation. . .. Many permits issued by the
221 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852-1854 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
222. 898 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990).
223. Id. at 1492-93.
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United States have value as between private persons, but they may be
revoked without payment of compensation."'
This legal principle has also been applied in cases involving fishing
rights. In Burns Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston,' a federal district
court considered a claim that a ban on gillnet fishing constituted an
unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment. In that case, commercial
perch fishermen using gillnets in Lake Michigan challenged Indiana's
decision to revoke their gillnet permits. The fishermen argued that the
revocation constituted a taking of property for which they were entitled
to just compensation. The court disagreed, stating: "[T]here is a wealth
of federal precedent standing for the proposition that by purchasing or
otherwise obtaining a license to perform an act upon state owned land or
waterways an individual does not thereby acquire property that is subject
to takings clause protection against the licensor." 6 The court also noted
that fishing permits can constitute property for some purposes without
constituting property for takings purposes. 7  As courts have long
recognized, something can have value without being private property
subject to the Fifth Amendment if the "property right" is revoked by the
government."8 The Magnuson-Stevens Act, as amended by the Sustain-
able Fisheries Act, confirms this judicial precedent by providing that an
IFQ is a revocable permit which does not confer any right to compensa-
tion if revoked or limited.229
Although the "ownership" interest conferred by IFQs is revocable, the
fact remains that the right given by the public to the fishermen confers
significant economic benefits, at minimal cost to the recipient and with
little or no benefit to the public treasury.20 IFQ opponents contend this
224. Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
945 (1969). See also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-105 (1985) ("The United
States ... maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon which the public
lands can be used, leased, and acquired."); Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United
States, 389 F.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
225. 800 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
226. Id. at 727. See also Ridenour v. Furness, 504 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
227. Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. at 729-30.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973); Acton v. United States,
401 F.2d at 899; Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d at 1493; Osborne v. United
States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 n.5 (9th Cir. 1944); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943,
948 (7th Cir. 1983).
229. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(d)(2), (3) (West 1985 & Supp 1997).
230. The Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments authorize the collection of a fee of up
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"ownership" is unnecessary and unrelated to fisheries conservation and
management.
While IFQs do confer significant economic benefits, it is important to
recognize that the potential solutions which are designed to eliminate IFQ
ownership and capture the value of the resource for the public benefit can
raise equally troubling issues. For example, if the Magnuson-Stevens Act
allowed an annual auctioning of fishery shares, much of the value of the
fishery would be captured for the public and all fishermen willing to bid
would have an opportunity to participate in the fishery. However, the
practical result could be that all but the wealthy would be disenfranchised,
unless the Councils and the Secretary devised a system for restricting the
share size that could be purchased and reserved some of the allowable
harvest for certain classes of fishermen. Such restrictions reduce the
likelihood that the market, through the transfer and accumulation of
shares, will determine the most efficient scale in which the fishery should
operate. Over time, an IFQ system should permit the market to determine
optimum efficiency in terms of share size, vessel size, fishing techniques,
fishing season, etc. Moreover, an annual auction may have the unin-
tended consequence of making long-term planning for the acquisition of
vessels and gear more difficult-not to mention the associated problem of
obtaining bank financing. Finally, IFQ systems are premised on the
theory that a long-term conservation advantage will result from granting
fishery participants a vested interest in a fishery. But this advantage
would be somewhat diminished if a fisherman's vision of the future was
limited to one year.
The annual auction concept could be modified by extending the term of
the quota share to more than one year. Nevertheless, depending on the
duration of the share, such a system could have many, if not all, of the
problems associated with an annual auction. For example, no single IFQ
term would coincide with everyone's investment cycle and an IFQ of a
limited duration would impose a corresponding degree of dislocation in
long-term economic planning and capital financing.
If quota shares are awarded at no cost, or are leased or auctioned in
some manner, the question that inevitably arises is whether persons who
to three percent of the ex-vessel price of fish harvested under an IFQ plan to recover the
costs directly related to the management and enforcement of the IFQ Plan. Id. § 1843(d)(2).
The Secretary was also authorized to collect a fee of no more than one-half percent of the
value of any limited access permit with the fee to be collected upon the award of the permit
and upon any transfer. Id. § 1855(h)(5).
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have acquired shares should be allowed to transfer them. Transferability
introduces market forces into the determination of the optimum scale for
prosecuting the fishery assuming the auction or lease price, when com-
pared to vessel operating costs and the ex-vessel price of the fish, leaves
an economic margin that allows for the sale or lease of the quota shares.
Transferability, however, raises questions regarding whether the
transfers will result in an unreasonable concentration of fishing privileges.
This is both a social issue and an economic question. Social policy may
argue against allowing market forces to alter the character of the fishery
by displacing certain participants, but it can also be argued that market
allocation allows more efficient use of resources with the antitrust laws
providing a brake on the excessive concentration of shares.
Noting these issues, a Council and the Secretary could manipulate the
variables of IFQ price, duration, and transferability in numerous ways.
Depending on the mixture, some or all of the aforementioned problems
arise. For example, if the FMP eliminates the auction by setting the price
at or near zero and limits the term of the quotas, the Council forfeits the
full recapture of rent for the public. The Council also incurs the problem
of redesigning the allocation system at the end of the term, for if no
redesign is planned, the allocation takes on the character of a permanent
IFQ.
The preceding issues, though important, are structural and beg the
question of whether IFQs can be helpful from a conservation and manage-
ment perspective. The fundamental issue is whether IFQs can assist in
preventing overfishing and reducing bycatch.
Although there are several aspects to the overfishing issue, the existence
of an IFQ plan allocating the allowable catch does not change the amount
of the total allowable catch. Still, the setting of the total allowable catch
is not a precise and formulistic process that occurs with absolute certainty
in the data. To the extent the data is subject to reasonable, but subjective,
interpretation, an open-access fishery with excess fishing capacity can
easily result in enormous pressure from fishermen to allow the largest
possible harvest. Erring on the side of increased harvest levels may not
be in the long-term interest of the resource. If IFQs are structured to vest
fishermen with a long-term interest in conserving the resource, decision
makers are likely to be under less pressure to maximize harvests.
Non-IFQ limited entry systems are less likely to offer the same potential
conservation advantage as IFQs in regards to reducing the demand for
increased harvests. Merely limiting the number of fishermen or vessels
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in a fishery does not limit the growth of capacity and fishing power as
larger and more efficient replacement vessels and gear are added. The
number of units participating in the fishery may be controlled, but the
overcapacity problems of open access can be replicated. After the total
allowable catch is established, the problem that arises is ensuring that
fishermen do not exceed it. This can be a particularly thorny issue in
many open-access fisheries due to the difficulty managers have in effec-
tively monitoring the harvest rate. The greater the overcapacity problem
and the rapidity with which the fishery is prosecuted, the more difficult it
is to monitor harvest levels and the greater the likelihood that the harvest
will exceed allowable levels. IFQs can alleviate this problem by eliminat-
ing the race to the fish. A non-IFQ limited entry system is less likely to
be effective in this regard, unless it also limits effort so as to eliminate
overcapacity and the competition for who can harvest the most fish in the
shortest time.
Although IFQs will generally be more effective than other management
systems in preventing overfishing during the fishing season, a race for the
fish can still occur under an IFQ system where the fishery is best prose-
cuted in a limited area or during a specific time. In such a situation, there
could still be a race, but with fewer participants. There is also the
problem of whether the establishment of IFQs in one fishery will cause
displaced vessels to enter other fisheries and create an overcapacity
problem there.
Ending the race to the fish through IFQs can, however, can create
highgrading"' problems. This process can result in overfishing from
undercounting the harvest. IFQ proponents argue that highgrading and
undercounting is controllable because at-sea enforcement is easier with
IFQs because the restricted fishing effort provides enforcement agents
with greater observation opportunities. Another deterrent to the practice
of highgrading is the self-interest of fishermen who have a vested owner-
ship interest in the long-term health of the resource. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that highgrading, though not peculiar to IFQ systems, is a
phenomenon which is more likely to occur in an IFQ fishery.
By ending the race to the fish associated with an overcapitalized open-
access fishery, IFQs allow fishermen the time to fish in ways that reduce
231. The process by which fishermen take the time to sort the catch and keep only the
best market fish, discarding the remainder and then repeating the process until the IFQ is
reached.
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the bycatch of non-target and prohibited species. While other manage-
ment techniques, such as time and area closures may still be necessary to
control bycatch, IFQs can be a useful tool. Generally, IFQs are a better
tool than non-IFQ limited entry systems unless the system can eliminate
the race to the fish.
To the extent that accurate reporting of landings is an important element
in monitoring harvest levels to prevent overfishing, limited entry systems
can improve enforcement by creating an enforcement "paper trail" that
requires proof of a fishing permit to cover the landings and which also
requires purchasers to document purchases of a specified amount from a
permitted harvester. Within the range of limited entry systems, those that
assign individual quotas will be more effective from an enforcement
perspective and those that establish enforcement systems will allow
managers to monitor landing levels and to act against persons exceeding
their quotas.
Many of these conservation benefits are directly related to ending the
race to harvest the allowable catch. Although IFQs may be more likely
to succeed in this regard than non-IFQ limited entry systems, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the transferability of IFQs may not be necessary to
achieve these conservation benefits. In fact, transferability would not
generally relate to conservation issues unless transferability allows the
elimination of overcapacity problems that are related to conservation
issues. For example, if overcapacity in the fishery causes crowding on
the fishing grounds, gear conflicts, and gear loss, the lost gear can raise
conservation issues if it continues to "ghost fish."
While much of the IFQ debate focuses on the economic aspects of
IFQs, such plans can change the economics of the fishery in other
respects. First, by ending the race to the fish, fishermen can carry an
optimal number of crew and gear instead of carrying extra gear and crew
to increase fishing speed. Second, gear entanglements and conflicts are
likely to be reduced and the cost of replacing lost gear will be lessened.
Third, fishermen may be able to plan their fishing season to maximize the
catch per unit of effort instead of experiencing the higher operating costs
associated with fishing when the season opens but when fish availability
may be lower. Fourth, ex-vessel prices and, therefore, crew income may
increase because the fishermen can take more time to preserve the quality
of the harvested fish, adjust trip length, and avoid the pricing problems
associated with a glut of fish. Fifth, processors can plan processing
strategies to reduce operating and fish storage costs by spreading deliver-
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ies and processing activities over time. Sixth, processors can increase the
amount of product from the fish since a glut of fish associated with
shortened fishing seasons overloads processing plants and encourages the
processing of only the highest value product. Seventh, greater economic
stability will reduce the cost of investment capital.
Despite these potential advantages, IFQs can have significant adverse
impacts on the economic position of fishermen who do not receive quota
shares and who can no longer participate in the fishery, unless such
fishermen have an alternative fishery in which they can participate. It is
also important to recognize that non-IFQ limited access systems which
eliminate the race to the fish can achieve the benefits enumerated in the
preceding paragraph and that transferability is generally unlikely to be
necessary to achieve these benefits.
Finally, IFQs can improve safety on the fishing grounds if fishermen
are no longer compelled to fish in adverse weather conditions because that
is when the season or opening occurs. Again, IFQs, including transfer-
able IFQs, are not the only way to achieve this benefit but they are more
likely to do so unless the alternative management system ends the race to
the fish and allows fishermen to determine their harvesting season and
strategy.
Whether IFQs are a necessary conservation measure is a question that
can only be answered on a fishery-by-fishery basis. What can be said is
that IFQs can be a useful conservation tool. It can also be said that some
type of effort limitation is likely to be necessary in almost every profitable
fishery. If a reasonable economic return can be realized from the fishery,
it will continue to attract participation. In fact, success in preventing
stock depletion using traditional management tools will encourage more
fishermen to enter the fishery to take advantage of the potential profit,
thereby creating the drift toward an overcapitalized open access fishing
derby. Unfortunately, limited entry alone may not be successful in
preventing the problems associated with overcapitalization because
limiting the number of units in the fishery does not address the capacity
of those units and prevent increased pressure on the resource due to
increased and improved fishing capacity. Thus, for some fisheries, IFQs
are the next evolutionary step in management.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Is there a legal and conservation basis for IFQs? The answer to both
questions is yes. Although IFQs may not be the universally correct
solution, IFQs can be a useful and appropriate conservation and manage-
ment measure. How useful and how appropriate is a question to be
answered based on the conditions in each individual fishery.
